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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER

THE EsTATE oF
MARION EuGENE HARMSTON, DEcEASED.
OF

ROGERS T. HARMSTRON,
MARION EUGENE HARMSTON,
HELENE G. GILLIS AND CARL
FREDERICK HARMSTON,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

1

CASE
No. 73'62

vs.

J. H. CALDER, as the Administrator
of the Estate of Marion Eugene
Harmston, Deceased,

Defendant ,and Respondent.

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT

At th·e outset we direct the attention of the court to
the fact that on the cover page and again on page 1 of
the brief filed on behalf of Roger T. Harms ton, et al,
it is designated as ''Brief of Respondents''. This brief
is filed on behalf of J. H. Calder, who disclaims all
responsibility for what is sraid in the brief filed by Roger
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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T. Harms ton, et al, and he shall characterize himself
as the respondent, which in fact he is.

MOTION TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THE STATEMENT OF ERRORS IS
FATALLY D·E:FECTIVE.
Comes now the respondent, J. H. Calder, and moves
the court to either dismiss the ·appeal or affirm the
judgment and decree appealed from for the reason and
upon the grounds that the brief filed by the appellants
is not in conformity with Rule 8 of this court and the
statement of errors contained in said brief of appellants
is so general and uncertain in that such statement does
not specify what p.articular ·errors are relied upon by
appellants for a reversal of the judgment or decree
'appealed from. On the contrary the statement of errors
in effect merely states that such decree or judgment is
wrong and against law.
This motion is made upon the statement of errors
contained ·on page 31 and repeated on page 32 of the
brief filed on behalf of Roger T. Harmston, et al.
It has repeatedly been held by this court that it is
without jurisdiction to review ;a cause appealed from a
lower court in the absence of assignments of error.
Smith Table Co., vs. Madsen, 30 Ut. 297; 84 Pac. 885.
Lyon vs. Mauss, 31 Utah 283; 87 Pac. 1014. So also has
it been repeatedly held by this court that an assignment
of errors which does not advise the court with p·articularity the error relied upon for a reversal of a judgment
or decree is fa tally defective and the court will affirm
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the judgment unless the error or errors relied upon .are
specified with particularity. Bauwhuis, et al, vs. Johnson, ·68 Utah 544; 251 Pac. 359 where numerous cases
from this jurisdiction are cited. A general discussion
of the functions and requirements of assignments of
errors "\Yill be found discussed 'at length in 4 C.J.S., page
1770 where it is said that:
''An assignment of error must be sufficient
to point out in what particular respect the action
complained of was erroneous and the grounds
or reasons for the contention unless the error is
manifest and it must not be vague and general
in this respect. ''
To the same effect see 3 Am. Jur., page 293, Sec. 70/3
where it is said :
''An assignment of errors must be specific.
A general assignment without specification of the
particular point relied on gives no information
to the -appellate court or to the adverse party
and will not as a general rule be considered. The
assignment should point out the place in the
record where the incidents complained of may
be found."
Cases will be found cited from various state and
federal courts 1n support of and which do support
the text.
It will be observed that assignments 1, 3, 4, 5 ~and
6 on page 31 of the Harmston brief, some of which are
repeated on page 32 of the brief, merely state that
certain orders, findings of fact, conclusions of la"\v and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment are not supported by the law. Just what is
meant by such claimed errors it is impossible to ascert~ain from the assignments. Is it claimed that the findings of fact are contrary to law and if so which of the
findings of fact, if any, are contrary to law~ If a found
fact is established by evidence it cannot be contrary to
law. So also if conclusions of law find support in the
facts found the same may not be s1aid to be contrary
to law.
In assignment numbered 2 it is said the uncontradicted evidence does not support the findings of fact,
conclusions of law or the judgment entered herein on
the 3rd day of January, 1949. We do not understand
that uncontradicted evidence is required to support
findings of fact, conclusions of law or judgment. Many,
if not most, findings of fact 1are upheld when there is
a conflict in the evidence.
In ~a broad sense it may doubtless be said that
every judgment is contrary to law where prejudicial
error was committed at the trial. Thus to say that a
judgment is contrary to law totally £ails to inform the
court :or counsel wherein the judgment is contrary to
law. Nor does the statement of errors advise the court
or counsel wherein or what findings and conclusions
appellants claim is or are contrary to law.
As to assignment number 5 there is nothing to indicate wherein the court erred in denying appellants'
motion for 'a new trial. If appellants cannot prevail
because of some deemed error not properly assigned
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it follows that they eannot prevail because the court·
denied a ne'Y trial. It is not error to deny a new trial
in the absence of some prejudicial error having occurred
at the trial.
If assignments of error are to serve any useful purposes, as the courts uniformly hold they do, then ~and
in such case the statement of errors in appellants' brief
totally fail to serve such purpose.
It will also be observed that the record filed in this
cas·e is somewhat lengthy and notw,.ithstanding such fact
the statement of errors does not refer to where in the
reeord the claimed errors may be found.
It is submitted that the judgment should be affirmed
because there are no sufficient assignment or statement
of errors made on behalf of the appellants.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE
If the above motion is granted, as we contend it
should be, then and in such case that of course will
end this controversy. In the event the court should
conclude otherwise we direct the attention of the court
to some additional facts which we deem material to consider in reviewing the record in this case.
In order to enable the court to find the place in
the record where there may he found the p~arts thereof
which we refer to it will be ·observed that the numbering
of the pages begins with what is designated as the bill
of exceptions. The pages of that part of the record
are numbered consecutively, and then the probate files
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston, beginning
with page 205 are numbered consecutively. We shall
refer to such pages in the course of this brief.
After the death of Isabelle Thurston Harmf;'ton, the
administratrix of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston,
J. H. ·Calder was in April, 1938 appointed administrator
de bonis non of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston.
(R. 349) He furnished the bond fixed by the court and
on April 30th, 1938 letters of administration were issued
to J. H. Calder. (R. 350) The petition for letters of
~administration was filed by the Farmers and Merchants
Bank, a corporation, which held a note signed by Isabelle
T. Harmston and Isabelle T. Harmston, administratrix
of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston. The note
was secured by a mortgage on Lots 29, 30, 31 and 32,
Block 9, Plat ''A'' Roosevelt Townsite, Duchesne County,
Utah. The mortgage was executed by Isabelle Harmston
individually and as administratrix of the ·estate of
Marion Eugene Harmston. The findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of foreclosure are set out in
the record, pages 97 to 116. The property covered by
the mortgag·e was sold to. satisfy the amount owing
on the note and mort~a.ge. (R. 302)
At the time the note and mortgage were executed
the real property covered by the mortgage on July 31,
1937 (R. 89) was a part of the estate of Marion Eugene
Harmston. (R. 323) The inventory and appraisement
filed by Isabelle Harmston and decree of partial distribution Wla.s entered on August 30, 1937 by which decree

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'

of distribution the property 'vas decreed to Isabelle
Thurston Harmston. (R. 340)
T'he money that 'vas loaned to Isabelle Fiarmston
individually and as administratrix of the estate was
used to construct a service station on the property
mortgaged ta.nd which p·roperty stood in the na1ne of
Marion Eugene Harmston at the time the money was
so loaned. (Tr. 51-52)
The rents and profits derived from the property
were collected by Roger T. Harmston. (R. 74)
During the time that Isabelle T. Harmston was
administratrix of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston
the property was sold for taxes and bought in by MJ-s.
Harmston for the sum of $510.52. (R. 39) The property
was again sold for taxes in 1936 and an auditor's tax
deed issued in May, 1941 to Charles W. Jenkins for
$459.87. On October 18, 1941 Charles W. Jenkins and
wife conveyed the property to Roger Harmston, one of
the plaintiffs herein, for the sum of $53_5.77. (R. 40)
It will thus be seen that when J. H. Calder was
appointed administrator of the estate of Marion Eugene
Harmston there w~re taxes owing and the prop·erty had
been sold because of the failure to pay the same.
When Calder learned that taxes were owing upon
Lots 5 to 12 of the property belonging to the estate he
was without any funds belonging to the estate to pay
the same (R. 23), and so informed Roger Harmston,
one of the heirs and a plaintiff herein who promised
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to pay such delinquent taxes and thus redeem it for · · ·
the heirs. ( R. 49)
After Isabelle H1armston was appointed administratrix of her deceased husband's, Marion Eugene Harms ton
Estate and on June 19, 1922 (R. 312) she, on June
14, 1926, filed an inventory and appraisement of the
estate. (R. 273) She listed Lots 29, 30, 31 and 32, which
'\Vere later distributed to her, also Lots 8, 9 and 10,
Block 32, and Lots from 5 to 12, $200.00 cash; three
cows 1and one calf and a half interest in 300 shares and
10 shares of stock in the Texas Standard Oil Company
of the value of $150.00 as constituting the assets of
the estate. ( R. 323)
• After Calder was appointed administrator of the
estate of Marion Eugene Harmston he caused 1an inventory and reappraisement of the estate to be made and
filed. He listed Lots 29, 30, 31 and 32 but the same
were not appraised. He listed Lots 5 to 12 and the
same were appraised at $1500.00. Lots 8, 9 arid 10
were listed and appraised at $900.00.
The ·stock in the T·exas Standard Oil Company was
also listed but no value placed thereon. The ap:praisement is dated Sept. 9, 1939 tand was filed in court on
Sept. 26, 1939. The total value of the estate was placed
at $2400.00 (R. 373)
Mr. Calder secur·ed an order authorizing him to sell
Lots 8, 9 and 10 under date of March 6, 1939. (R. 359)
On September 25, 1939 the court approved the sale of
Lots 8, 9 and 10 to Harry W. Larson for the sum of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$1000.00, of "\Yhich $150.00 'Yas C'nsh and the ren1ainder
"\Yas to be paid at $12.50 per month with interest on the
unpaid portion at 6% per annum until the "~hole amount
\\~as p·aid. (R. 375) Larson defaulted in his payments
and Calder conveyed the property to Charles W.
Jenkins, subject to the rights of Larson, the original
purchaser. (R. 11) Larson paid a total of $297.50
before he defaulted. Jenkins agreed to pay and did
pay $1075.00 principal and $142.50 interest. (R. 12) The
estate thus realized $1539.00 from the sale of the prop. erty which was the amount reported in the account
of Calder. ( R. 391)
On April 19, 1940 Roger T. Harms ton, one of the
heirs, filed a petition to revoke the letters of administration to J. H. C1alder in which p·etition it is, among other
rna tters, in substance alleged:
"That J. H. Calder was 1appointed administrator of
the estate on July 28, 1938 and letters of administration
issued to him. That said J. H. Calder is not entitled
to said administration without the consent of the heirs.''
"That the said heirs of said deceased have heretofore
given their consent to said administration but that this
petitioner alleges that during the past year or two
it has been unnecessary, expensive and inconvenient to
administer said estate with the administrator and his
attorney both residing at Provo, Utah.'' The petition
was signed and verified by Roger T. Harmston and was
also signed by Merril H. Larsen, attorney for the petitioner. (R. 377)
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To the petition the attorney for c~alder filed
demurrer. (R. 382)

It

On June 3, 1940 Judge Young ordered the revocation of letters of administration to Calder and that
letters issue to a person claiming under prior rights.
The court further ordered the payment of all proper
charges and directed the administrator to file a report.
(R. 384) On September 4, 1940 a similar order was made
and Roger T. Harmston was ordered appointed administrator, his bond was fixed at $500.00 if a surety bond
and $800.00 if a personal bond. (R. 385) The orders
above mentioned appear in the minute entries. So far
as appears no formal written order was ever made.
Also so far as appears Roger T. Harmston never took
an oath of office and no letters of administration were
ever issued to him. He did file a bond which was never
ap:proved. ( R. 386)
So far as the probate files show no further proceedings were had until August 30, 1947 when Calder filed
a final account and petition for distribution. (R. 387-391)
Also (R. 444 to 448).
After the hearing was had and the account approved
Calder paid to eounsel for the plaintiffs the sum of
$1018.51 as ordered by the court (R. 480) and Calder was
discharg.ed and his sureties released from all liability.
(R. 481)
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CROSS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Comes now the respondent 'and makes the following
cross assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in admitting the files in
cause numbered 1931 civil. (R. 28 and 29)
2. The trial eourt erred in admitting in evidence
the files in cause numbered 1932 civil. (R. 28 and 29)
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence
over respondent's objection the files in the probate proceedings in the matter of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, the same being probate file 374. (R. 28 and 29)
3.

The tri,al court erred in rejecting evidence that
Calder prepared a report and account and mailed it to
~lerril Larsen, attorney for Roger T. Harmston. (R. 76)
4.

ARGUMENT
As to the cross assignments of error it may be
that respondent has not been prejudiced. We are at a
loss, however, to see the materiality of the mortgage
foreclosure proceedings had in case number 1931, the
same being the action to recover on a note and foreclose
a mortgage for $2500.00 executed by Isabelle T. Harmston as an individual. The fact that Is1abelle T. Harmston
gave a note and a mortgage or the proceedings had to
foreclose the same could not have any bearing on the
question of whether or not J. H. Calder properly administered the estate of Marion Eugene H armston. So also
and for the same reason the proceedings had in the
1
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rna tter of the estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton are in no
way material to any controversy involved in this proceeding. It will be noted that there are about 200 pages
of the Bill of Exceptions devoted to ta copy of such
proceedings. Unless the attention of the court is directed
to such matter it might well be confusing to the court
as it has to the writers of this brief. Nor are the files
in cause numbered 1932 civil enlightening, except possibly to show that the property foreclosed was owned
by Marion Eugene Harmston at ·the time the $4500.00
note and mortgage were executed, a fact which is not
disputed, and is established beyond controversy by the
probate files in the Marion Eugene Htarmston estate.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE ONLY PROPERTY THAT
CAME INTO POSSESSION OF J. H. CALDER
WAS THE PROPERTY WHICH HE SOLD.
Beginning on page 32 of appellants' brief it is
argued that property other than Lots 8, 9 and 10 came
in to the possession of Calder. It is true that Calder
listed in his inventory other property, namely: Lots 3
to 12, which were appraised at $1500.00 but the evidence
conclusively shows that he never had tactual possession of
such property. That property stood in the name of
Isabelle Harmston, the widow of the deceased, by reason
of her having received an auditor's tax deed. She paid
$510.52 to Duchesne County for the property. (R. 39)
Calder was wholly without funds to pay the taxes which
had been paid by Mrs. H1armston, the mother of all
of the heirs who are here complaining. If Cald~r had
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brought suit against the n1other of the· heirs to recover
the property and charged the expenses against the estate
of Marion Eugene Harmston we "\Yonder 'vhat the court
and those interested in the estate 'vould have s1a.id about
such useless expenditure of the assets of the estate,
especially so in light of the fact that it could make no
difference to the persons interested in the estate
after the death of Isabelle Harmston as to whether their
father or mother held the title to the property. The
evidence further shows that Calder never collected any
of the rents or profits from such property (R. 8) On
the contrary Roger T. Harmston had possession of that
property and collected the rents therefrom after the Utah
Savings and Trust Company ceased to act as administrator of the Isabelle Harmston estate. (R. 29 and 37)
The estate of Isabelle T. Harmston claimed th1at property and in the inventory and appraisement -of Isabelle
T. Harmston's estate, the Utah Savings and Trust
Company reported the same as a part of that estate.
(R. 491) That company collected the rents and profits
therefrom up to the time it was relieved as administrator. It should further be noted that under date of
April 15, 1940 Roger T. Harmston prepared a petition
to have the Utah Stavings and Trust Company removed
as administrator of the Isabelle Harmston estate and
have himself app;ointed. (R. 226 to 228) Roger T.
Harmston was appointed administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. H1armston to succeed the Utah Savings and
Trust Company by an order made on December 4, 1940.
(R. 248-251) He furnished a bond which is dated Feb.
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29, 1941 from which time he collected the rents on Lots
5 to 12. Thus the only evidence which tends to show
that Calder ever had possession of Lots 5 to 12 is that
said lots are listed in the inventory. The evidence as
above indicated is that Calder never collected one cent
of the rents or profits but the same were collected by
the administ:r'~ators of the estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton
and that such administrators claimed the property fo~
said estate. It is axiomatic that the law does not require
the doing of a useless thing. It may be inquired what
useful purpose would be served by Calder bringing an
action to recover title to Lots 5 to 12. Where could he
get the money to prosecute such an 'action unless he
advanced it himself~ If he had succeeded in recovering
the property it would be distributed to the same persons
who will receive it if it comes through the estate of the
mother, Isabelle T. Harmston.
Possession of property means, as we understand it,
more than to list property in an inventory. The evidence
shows that the title to Lots 5 to 12 stands in the name
of Roger T. Harmston who purchased it for the use of
the heirs.
As to the stock in the Texas Standard Oil Company
the evidence shows that Calder had never received any
such certificate and from correspondence he learned that
the company was defunct. (R. 10) He made inquiry
about the $200.00 reported by Mrs. Harmston as being
in the hank but there was no such money nor could be
found any cows or calves belonging to the estate. (R. 9)
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There is no evidence 1o refute the testiinony of Calder.
If there 'vas any stock of value belonging to the estate
of Harmston it is more than likely that some of the
children 'vould know about its existence. Calder having
attempted to locate such stock and having learned that
the company had ceased to exist there was nothing more
he could do.
Complaint is made because Calder sold the property to Larson and subsequently sold to Jenkins. At the
time the sale was made to Jenkins in 1942 it was not
necessary for an administrator to secure the consent
of the court to sell real estate. Chapter 113, page 154,
Laws of Utah 1939, now U.C.A. 1943, 102-10-5. ·It will
be noted from the contract of sale ''Protestants' Exhibit
1" that the sale was made subject to confirmation by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate of Marion
Eugene Harmston, deceased, and also subject to the
rights of Harry W. Larson. It will further be noted
that C1alder received $1539.00 in principal and interest
for the property, (R. 9) while the property was appraised at only $900.00. The last payment made by
Jenkins was on February 2, 1946 as shown by the re·:port
filed on August 30, 1947. (R. 391) Pursuant to an order
to show cause another report was made on August 30,
1948. (R. 444)
Counsel for the plaintiffs has been paid the money
derived from the sale of the property and given his
receipt therefor (R. 480). It is stated on page 29 of
appellant ''s brief that it might not be amiss to here state
that there is now an action pending to recover back the
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property (Lots 8, 9 and 10). Apparently appellants
believe that they can have their cake and eat it too. If
the plaintiffs believe they still have a right to the property it is indeed difficult to see why they are conlplaining because we turned over to their representative
the proceeds from the sale of the property, less certain
items of expense. If as app·ellants contend they are
still the owners of the property which Calder sold and
their representative has the money derived from the
sale of said property then 1and in such case it is difficult
for us to understand why appellants are here complaining because Calder sold the property to Jenkins with a
provision in such contract to the effect that Jenkins
should take the p·roperty subject to the rights of Larson.
It is further said on page 34 of appellants' brief
that C1alder failed to secure the confirmation of the sale
of the property to Jenkins and that it does not appear
that Calder had the ability to dispossess Larson. We
can understand how there might be some controversy
between Larson and Jenkins as to their respective
rights to the property sold, but they are, as it so appears, s1atisfied with what was done and the rep·resentatives of the plaintiffs having received the money derived
from the sale are in no way injured by any defect in
the ti tie of Jenkins. Indeed they are benefited by the
manner in which Calder disposed of the property. If
Calder had become involved in litigation with Larson
in an effort to dispossess Larson such a proceeding
would obviously cost the estate a substantial sum which
would be taken out of the assets of the estate.
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The generally accepted Yiew is that the conveyance
of property authorized to be sold may be made to the
assignee of the purchaser or to such person as the purchaser may indicate. Eu·ing vs. H'igby, 7 Ohio 198; 28
Am. D. 248; McKee vs. Simpson, 36 F. 248; Hallick vs.
Grey, 9 Cal. 18; 70 Am. D. 643; Hobson vs. Ewan, 62 Ill.
146; White vs. Jones, 88 N.C. 166; West vs. Burgie, 75
Ark. 516; 88 S.W. 557; Pruit vs. Holly, 73 Ala. 269.
1

While the evidence in this case does not show that
Jenkins had any arrangements with Larson it is a
reasonable inference that he had some understanding
"~th Larson as otherwise Jenkins would not have undertaken to purchase the property.
nioreover the representatives of the appellants
having accepted and retained the money derived from
the sale of the property they are now estopped from
questioning the validity of the sale. Warner vs. Hill,
153 Fa. 510; 112 S.E. 478; Allen vs. Bekmier (Tex.) Civ.
App. 216 S.W. 647; Gilbert vs. Ho'([J1kins, 204 Fed. 196,
122 C.C.A. 482; Myers vs. Boyd, 144 Ind. 496; 43 N.E.
567; Powers vs. Scharling, 76 Kans. 855; 92 Pac. 1099;
Estrade vs. K aack, 126 La. 26; 52 S. 181; ~willie vs.
Brooks, 45 Miss. 542; Meddes vs. Kenney, 176 Mo. 200;
75 S.W. 633; Mote vs. Kleen, 83 Neb. 585; 119 N.W.
1125; Matten vs .. Brown, 141 N.Y.S. 318; Browne vs.
Coleman, 62 Ore. 454, 125 P. 278.
So 1also do the authorities hold that before a sale
may be vacated it is necessary to offer or tender back
the money paid before the sale may be set aside.
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C..J.S., page 611, Sec. 630 and
cases cited in footnotes.
34

~4

,Q.J., I[Jiage 680 and

So also a sale made by an executor or administrator is barred by the statutes of limitation after three
years. U.·G.A. 1943, 104-2-17.
The attention of the court is also directed to U.C.A.
1943, 102-10-6 which gives any person interested in an
estate the right to bring an action for the neglect or
misconduct of a personal representative in making a
sale of property if the person complaining has sustained
damage by reason thereof. No claim is here made that
the heirs have sustained any damage by reason of the
sale to Jenkins even if it be held, cont~ary to our contention, that such sale was improvidently made. The
evidence shows that the p·roperty was depreciating 1n
value at the time the sale was made (R. 22).
J. H. CALD·ER WAS PROPERLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
MARION EUGENE HARMSTON.
It is contended at some length in appellants' brief
that Calder was not properly 'appointed administrator
of the estate. No such claim was made by any of the
appellants until on October 15, 1947 when Roger T.
Harmston filed his amended petition seeking the revocation of the letters of administration issued to Calder
on May 28, 1938 (R. 402 to 408).
Roger T. Harmston did file a petition to h'ave
Calder's letters revoked in 1938, because, as therein al-
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leged: ''The said heirs of said deceased have heretofore given their consent to such administration but that
this petitioner alleges that during the past year or two
it has been unnecessarily expensive 'and inconvenient
to administer said estate with the administrator and
his attorney both residing at Provo, Utah" (R. 377378).
doubt very much that the grounds alleged in
such petition are sufficient to withstand the demurrer
filed thereto, but no useful p·urpose would be served by
arguing such demurrer at this late date. The court
ordered the letters of C1alder revoked and directed that
letters of administration issue to Roger T. Harmston
(R. 385). ~ o formal order appears to have been made.
On October 15, 1942 a surety bond was filed but so far
as shown by the record no oath of office was filed and
no letters of administration issued to Roger T. Harmston. Calder prepiared an account and at the hearing he
attempted to show that a copy of the account was sent
to the attorney for Roger T. Harmston but the court
rejected the evidence of the sending of such account (R.
75 and 76).

' Te

Some of the heirs of Marion Eugene Harmston alsa
assisted in securing a purchaser for Lots 8, 9 and 10
(R. 47).
It will thus be seen that the heirs at l1a w of Harmston recognized the fact that Calder was serving as
administrator by and with their approval and consent.
It is also made to appear from the evidence that the·
appell,ants have waived their right to act as adminisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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trators of the estate of their father; that they are no\v
estopp·ed by their conduct from questioning the right
of Calder to serve as administrator of said estate and
that they have ratified his appointment.
Moreover, as we have heretofore pointed out, Isabelle T. Harmston signed the note and mortgage as the
administratrix of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmstan and the money which she received was used to
improve property which was a part of that estate when
such improvements were made. It is of course elementary that every careful lawyer who is called upon to
foreclose a mortgage will make all parties defendants
who have or appear to have a claim subsequent or subject to the mortgage which is about to be foreclosed.
We are mindful that under our law an administrator must as a general rule secure an order of court
before he can mortgage the prop·erty of the estate. It
is a well settled law that an administrator may and fre-quently does enter into contracts or assumes obligations
for and on behalf of the estate and later have such acts
approved by the court. So far -as we are advised the
courts uniformly approve such acts if they are for the
benefit of the estate. In this case there can be no serious
question but that the improvements of the property
belonging to the estate was calculated to be beneficial to
the estate. It was by such means that the estate could
derive .an income from its otherwise unimpr?ved property. It is true that prior to the foreclosure of the
mortgage the mortgaged property was distributed to
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Isabelle T. Harmston but it does not necessarily follow
from such fact that the money loaned for the imp·rovcment of the property of the estate was not a benefit to
the estate. If l\Irs. Harmston had lived or if the mortgage on the property giYen to secure the money loaned
to improve the property had been paid who can say
that the probate court may not have required the estate
to pay some or all of the money borrowed upon the final
distribution of the estate. The fact that Mrs. Harmston
signed the note and mortgage as administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband was notice to the Farmers and l\Ierchants Bank that in the mind of Mrs. Harmston the estate was under some obligation to pay the
note. The Bank in its foreclosure proceeding was in no
position to claim that the estate of Marion Eugene
Harmston had no interest in the p.roperty covered by
the mortgage .and no obligation to pay a part or all of
the note signed by Mrs. Harmston, as administratrix
of her husband's estate.
The only safe way of setting that matter at rest
was to have an administrator of the estate appointed
and made a party to the foreclosure proceedings. Apparently none of the heirs at law were willing to serve
as administrator and therefore the Bank was compelled
to act in the matter before it could safely proceed to
foreclose its mortgage to the end that any interest that
the estate might have in the mortgaged property be foreclosed and the record owner of the property be p·recluded from making the claim that the estate of Marion
Eugene Harmston had an interest in the estate by
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reason of the property standing in the name of the deceased at the time the mortgage and note were executed
and the same were executed by the administr-atrix of
the estate.
In their brief appellants seem to rely on the case
of In re: Cloward's Estate, 95 Utah 453, 82 Pac. (2d)
336, 119 A.L.R. 123. The facts of that case are easily
distinguishable from the facts in this case. In the Cloward case some of the heirs were minors. The petition
of G. T. Bean was filed in less than three months after
the death of Amanda Cloward Searle. There was no
semblance of a claim in favqr of G. T. Bean against the
estate of Amanda Cloward Searle or against the estate
·of Thomas H. Cloward. There is nothing in that case
which indicates that any of the heirs at law of either
Cloward or Mrs. Searle ever consented to or ratified
the appointment of Bean as administrator. The Cloward
case is not authority for the doctrine that one who
claims to have an interest in an estate may not properly
be appointed administrator if it later turns out that his
claim is unenforcible. On page 344 of 82 Pac. (2d) in
the p·revailing opinion it is said :
"If the 1ap~pellant claims to be a creditor only
a prima facie showing is required, but if the proof
of this fails the petition should be dismissed.' '
The fact that the note and mortgage were signed by
Isabelle T. Harmston, as administratrix of the estate
of Marion Eugene Harmston, established a prima facie
case of liability of the estate and the court properl~\,.
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appointed Mr. Calder as administrator where, as here,
no one appeared to oppose the appointment. Under the
doctrine of unjust enrichment or quasi contracts the
estate might 'Yell be held liable for the improvements
placed upon the p·roperty 'Yith the money loaned by the
bank.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON·CL USIONS OF
h.\W SUPPORT THE ORDER MADE
0~ DECEMBER 21, 1948.
Beginning on page 40 of appellants' brief under
the heading "Point II" it is contended that various of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
Trial Court are erroneous. We have already discussed
most of the questions discussed under that heading, including subdivisions B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K and L
thereof.
In support of its claim that the mortgage to the
B,ank is invalid in so far as the estate of Mr. Harmston
is concerned the cases of Skebata v·s. Bear R·iver State
Bank of Utah, 205 Pac. (2d) 251 and Parks vs. Illinois
Life Insurance Company, 176 Okla. 63, 54 Pac. (2d) 392
ar·e cited. In the Skebata case the mortgage was to secure money not for the benefit of the estate but for the
use and benefit of a third person. No such question is
here ·presented because the money in this case was
loaned and used for the improvement of property which
belonged to the estate at the time the money was loaned.
In the Oklahoma case the court did hold that a
mortgage of prop·erty of an estate must be authorized
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by the proper tribunal. We do not contend that an administrator of an estate may mortgage property for
the benefit of a third person nor do we contend that an
administrator may mortgage property for any purpose
other than for the benefit of the estate. What we do
contend is that in light of the fact that Mrs. Harmston
signed the note and mortgage as administratrix of he:t
husband's estate at the time the property stood in his
name it was proper to have the .administrator of the
estate made a p·arty to a foreclosure proceeding for the
purpose of foreclosing a mortgage purporting to bind
the estate and that one holding such a mortgage has
such an interest in the estate as will .authorize the
mortgagee to designate someone to act as administrator
so that any interest that the estate may claim in the
mortgaged property may be foreclosed, especially where
the money is loaned .and used for the improvement of
property belonging to the estate. That is all that is
her·e claimed by the respondent. We, of course, do not
know what arrangements, if any, Mrs. Harmston had
with her childrei!l when she had Lots 29 to 32 distributed
to her. So far as we know she may have continued to
hold it in trust for the other persons interested in the
estate. The fact remains that Mrs. Harniston signed
the note and mortgage as administratrix of the estate
of her deceased husband.
It is, of course, elementary that a mortgagor is a
necessary party defendant to a suit to foreclose .a mortgage. In view of the law being so well settled that
mortgagors are necessary parties to a foreclosure p·ro-
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c.eeding we shall be content by quoting the following
from the case of Ankeny v. Lieuallen, et a.l. , 127 Pac.
(2d) 735, 736:
''In mortgage foreclosure cases, all mortgagors, if living, or, if dead, their personal representatives, are 'proper and necesS'ary parties
defendant', and, if not made defendants, their
individual interest in the mortgaged property
would not be affected by the foreclosure.''
Not until there was a judicial determination of the interests or liability, if any, of the estate of Mr. Harmston
in or on the note and mortgage could that matter be said
to be set at rest. The only way that could be done was
to have an administrator .appointed and made a party
to the foreclosure suit. That result has been accomplished. The mortgage has been foreclosed and the estate
relieved from all liability on account of the note and
mortgage. As we understand the appellants make no
claim that the estate of Mr. Harmston has any interest
in the mortgaged property and the Bank makes no claim
that the estate is liable for any deficiency.
In appellants' brief they further contend that the
Bank having failed to file -a claim against the estate
within the time allowed in the Notice to Creditors it,
therefore, is not a creditor. There is no necessity of
filing a claim secured by a mortgage unless the mortgagee seeks a deficiency judgment. U..:C.A. 1943, 102-9-11.
It should be noted that under the provisions of U.~C.A.
1943, 102-4-3, letters of administration must be granted
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to any interested applicant when the p·ersons having a
better right fail to appear and claim letters of administration within three months after the death of decedent.
Obviously one claiming a lien on the property belonging
to an estate is interested therein even though such
person makes no claim beyond the enforcement of a lien
against the property belonging to or in which the estate
claims or may claim an interest in the property covered
by the lien.
On page 45 of appellants' brief it is said that the
p.roperty sold to Larson was not appraised within one
year of the sale. Counsel is in error in making that
statement. The property sold was appraised on September 9th, 1939 and the sale was approved on September
25, 1939 (R. 373-376).
On pages 45 and 46 of appellants' brief they again
discuss the failure of Calder to pay the taxes which
beeame due before he was appointed as administrator
and which p·roperty was purchased by Isabelle T. Harm.ston, who claimed to be the owner of such property. We
have already directed the attention of the court to the
fact that the heirs of Mr. and Mrs. Harmston were the
same, that Roger T. Harmston collected the rents and
profits derived from Lots 5 to 12; that Calder had no
funds to pay the taxes; that Roger T. Harmston agreed
to pay the taxes and that Rog·er T. Harmston now holds
the legal title to the property for the use and benefit of
the heirs. Pray how then may it be said that there is
any loss because Rog·er T. Harmston paid the taxes or
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"~hy Calder should be surcharged with anything for fail-

ing to do that which he was unable to do because of a
lack of funds and which Roger T. Harms ton agreed to
pay out of the funds which he collected and when, as
here, no damage has resulted to the estate because Roger
T. Harmston holds the legal title for the use and benefit of the estate. As we have heretofore observed why
should Calder have brought an action and squandered
v.~hat little assets the estate may have had when to do
so v.~ould have accomplished nothing of ultimate benefit
to the estate and when Calder was entirely without funds
of the estate to engage in such useless litigation~
In their brief appellants in one breath complain
that Calder was negligent because he failed to pay the
taxes on the p·roperty of the estate notwithstanding he
had no funds belonging to the estate and in the next
breath they contend that the property of the estate
should not have been sold because there was no necessity
to sell the same. If Mrs. Harmston's ·estate and Roger
T. Harmston are to be repaid the money which they advanced to pay the taxes which they are entitled to have
repaid we wonder where the money can be found to pay
the same without selling some of the property belonging
to the estate.
It will be observed that in the petition for the sale
of the property which was sold it is, among other things,
alleged that it is the desire of all of the heirs of said decedent and all persons interested herein that said
property be sold as aforesaid and at private sale (Tr.
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353). Such allegation finds support in the evidence (R.
23 and 47). There is no evidence to the contrary. That
being so the heirs are estopped from attacking the
validity of the sale. 34 C.J.S., Sec .. 606, page 637 and
cases cited in footnotes.
All that is said on page 46 of appellants' brief
applies equally to the purchase made by Roger T.
H:armston.
Complaint is made on pages 48 and 49 of appellants' brief because Calder permitted a default to be
entered against him in the foreclosure of Lots 29 to 32
and because Mr. Morgan was the attorney for Calder,
as administrator of Mr. Harmston's estate. It is irnpossible to conceive how the estate of Mr. Harmston
was in any way prejudiced by such facts. Appellants
in one breath contend that the estate of Marion Eugene
Harmston had no interest in the property because before
the mortgage was foreclosed the same was distributed
to Mrs. H~arm·ston and in the next breath contend that
Calder should not have permitted his default to be
entered and also that Morgan being the attorney for
the plaintiff in the mortgag·e foreclosure could not
represent Calder as administrator. We are mindful of
I

the rule that an at1 orney may not represent adverse
interests but we .ar·e at a loss to see how such rule is
applicable here where the ap·pellants contend that the
estate of Mr. Harmston had no interest in the mortgaged
property. It may be inquired how may one be charged
with re:presenting adverse intere:sts where, as here, it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
is contended by appellants that there were no adverse
interests to be represented. The facts shown by the
evidence are that Calder, as administrator, was made
a party defendant because it appeared from the mortgage that Mr. Harmston may claim some interest in
the property because the mortgage and note were
signed by the administratrix of his estate.
Numerous provisions of the Probate Code of Utah
are cited on pages 49 and 50 of appellants' brief. Of
course the duties there imposed upon the administrator
should be complied with and his failure to do so will
render him liable for damages sustained on account of
his failure to do so. The difficulty with appellants'
position is that there is a total absence of evidence to
sho\Y that anything that Calder did or failed to do resulted in any injury to the estate of Marion Eugene
Harmston or to those interested in his estate. On the
contrary jf Calder had done, what appellants claim he
should have done, in all probability all of the estate of
Mr. Harmston would have been squandered in attorney's
fees and court costs.
It has been the repeated and uniform holding of
this court that harmless error will not justify the reversal of a judgment. Such is the effect of U.'C.A. 1943,
102-11-20 referre·d to by appellants. Calder has accounted for the whole of the estate which has come into
his possession at the value of the app·raisement contained
in the inventory, together with the money which he secured in excess of the appraisement as required jn
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u.. c.A.

1943, 102-11-21. And such proceeds have been

delivered to and retained by the representative of the
appellants. C.alder was not accountable for uncollectible
debts or property, where as here, it appears that the
$200.00 reported by Mrs. Harmston was no longer in
the bank., the stock was valueless and doubtless the
cows and calf had died of old age before Calder became
:administrator. Moreover Mrs. Harmston doubtless expended much more than the value of the property which
was evidently disposed of by her before her death in
paying taxes on the property of the estate in the sum
of $510.52 (R. 39).
Complaint is als·o made because Calder delayed in
making distribution. The facts touching that phase of
the case .are: He was appointed on May 5, 1938 (R. 350).
On April 22, 1940 Roger T. Harmston filed a petition
seeking the revocation of the letters of administration
to Calder (R. 377). On June 3, 1940 and again on September 4, 1940 a minute order was made appointing
Roger T. Harmston administrator and relieving Calder.
So far as appears no formal order was ever made in
conformity with the minute order. On September 22nd
Roger T. Harmston filed a bond but so far as appears
never took the oath of office or had letters of administration issued to him (R. 386). The last payment on
the property which was sold was paid on February 21,
1946.

As soon as Calder was to have ceased acting as administrator and Harmston was to take over Calder
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caused to be prepared and sent to the attorney for
Harmston a report (R. 62 and 63). When respondent
sought to introduce the report of Calder so made by
J. Rulon Morgan, "Tho prepared the same, the trial
court, as we contend, erroneously rejected the same (R.
76).
It is pertinent to inquire what Calder could do that
he did not do under the circumstances. By a minute
order of the court he was required to cease acting as
administrator and Harmston was to take over. Harmstan having failed to qualify he could not lawfully take
over. Calder attempted to get Harmston to examine his
report before filing the same but apparently Harmston
refused or neglected to do anything about the accounts.
It is quite apparent that Calder did not wish to serve
as administrator if he could be relieved from serving.
If Harmston had qualified there can be no doubt but
that Calder would have been delighted to be relieved
from further serving.
The matter stood in that condition until August 30,
1947 when Calder filed his final account and petition
for distribution (R. 387-391).
JUDGE NELSON WAS A JUDGE WHEN HE
SIGNED THE ORDER DISCHARGING CALDER.
Under appellants' Point III on page 56 of their
brief it is stated that Judge Joseph E. Nelson was not
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ia District Judge when he entered the order discharging

Calder as administrator. Counsel is in error in making
such statement. Section 6 of Article 8 of the Constitution of Utah provides that District Judges are elected
for four years and shall hold office until the first Monday in January after their election and until their successors have qualified. If counsel had taken the trouble
to look up the public records he would have ascertained
that Judge Tuckett, who succeeded Judge Nelson, did
not take his oath of office until after the 6th day of
January, 1949.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REF·USING
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.
On page 57 of appellants' brief it is stated that the
trial court erred in denying appellants' motion for a
new trial. Nothing new is argued under that heading.
When the court examines this record it will find that
Calder has filed vouchers showing the amounts, dates
and purposes for which he expended the moneys coming
into his possession as administrator, including the money
which he paid to the representative of the appellants.
Such money is retained by the appellants and thereby
they are estopped from attacking the judgment appealed from as we have heretofore pointed out in our
motion to dismiss the appeal.
Moreover even though it should be found that Calder
has failed to strictly comply with some of the proviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

sions of our Probate Code there is a complete failure
of any evidence that appellants have sustained any injury because of such failure.
It is submitted that the judgment should be affirmed with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

J. RULON MORGAN
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Respondent.
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